Leiden Asia Centre Report: Preparing for the Actual Worst - Supporting Japanese Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Okinawa

This report asks and answers two questions: (1) What are the weaknesses in the Government of Japan’s (GOJ) current planning for receiving internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Okinawa prefecture? (2) How can GOJ, prefectural governments, and municipal governments better prepare to accept IDPs from Okinawa?

There are three primary weaknesses with GOJ’s current civil protection planning. First, it assumes that in a Taiwan Strait contingency, GOJ will have the political will to declare an “anticipated armed attack situation” early enough for a smooth and timely evacuation. It also assumes away complicating factors such as inbound Taiwanese refugee flows and outbound U.S. military deployment during the “anticipated armed attack situation” period. Second, it does not present potential IDPs with a convincing explanation of why they should evacuate to where GOJ is directing them to during a Taiwan Strait contingency. Furthermore, by being indecisive about where potential IDPs will be evacuated to, GOJ undermines the efforts of the prefectures and municipalities preparing to accept IDPs. Finally, GOJ is asking prefectural and municipal governments to plan for the first one month of evacuation, not the years that a hypothetical U.S.-China war over Taiwan could last.

The experiences of IDPs from the March 11 triple disaster – the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) and associated tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi – inform us that IDP-related policies will be more effective if they start with the assumption that once evacuated, IDPs are unlikely to return to Okinawa anytime soon. GOJ, prefectural, and municipal governments should offer support to IDPs from the very beginning with this long- term view. This will affect everything from Okinawans’ willingness to be evacuated, how much and how quickly financial support is offered, and who financial support is offered to. GOJ should also offer support based on the individual IDP’s present needs, instead of tying support to criteria such as when they fled or where they fled from. GOJ should prioritize offering long-term housing as soon as possible and creating an automatic, opt-out registration system to identify all IDPs, which will also allow GOJ to better communicate with IDPs and accurately assess IDPs’ evolving needs over time. At the prefectural and municipal levels, government officials should begin to cooperate with relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs), plan for the necessary bureaucratic reorganization to tackle the multi-faceted challenge of supporting IDPs, and prepare to deal with misinformation and disinformation about support for IDPs.

The lessons drawn from the March 11 experience for GOJ’s contingency planning can also inform the Netherlands and European Union (EU) member states’ planning for accepting and supporting IDPs associated with an invasion of an EU member state, climate change-related impacts, or other natural disaster.

For the full report, click here.

For part one of my summary on The Diplomat, click here.

Part two of my summary on The Diplomat is coming soon.